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This paper uses a dataset of more than 70,000 firms in 
over 100 countries to systematically study the use of 
different financing sources for new and young firms, in 
comparison to mature firms. The authors find that in all 
countries younger firms rely less on bank financing and 
more on informal financing. However, they also find 
that younger firms use more bank finance in countries 
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with stronger rule of law and better credit information, 
and that the reliance of young firms on informal finance 
decreases with the availability of credit information. 
Overall, the results suggest that improvements to the 
legal environment and availability of credit information 
are disproportionately beneficial for promoting access to 
formal finance by young firms. 
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1.  Introduction 
  Access to external finance and the ability to undertake profitable investment 
opportunities is an important ingredient for success of any new business and ultimately 
for economic development and growth (see Levine, 2005).  However, liquidity 
constraints hinder potential entrepreneurs from starting businesses (see, for example, 
Evans and Jovanovic, 1989) and reduce growth rates, especially in small businesses 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2004).  Relaxing these constraints can promote 
new firm entry and success.  For example, a cross-country study of 35 European 
countries finds that entry is higher in more financially dependent industries in countries 
that have greater financial development (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2006). 
Financing options of mature firms could be explained by the pecking order theory 
of financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  These firms generally have more internal funds 
(retained earnings) due to higher profitability and lower growth opportunities and, 
therefore, might prefer to use internal funds first (Bulan and Yan, 2007, Brealey and 
Myers, 2002).  Furthermore, a good reputation, such as a long credit history, mitigates the 
adverse selection problem between borrowers and lenders.  Mature firms, therefore, are 
able to obtain loans on better financial terms compared to their younger firm counterparts 
(Bulan and Yan, 2007; Carpenter and Rondi, 2000) and generally use debt before equity 
for their financing needs (Bulan and Yan, 2007).   
As a result, around the world, new firms without a proven track record experience 
more severe financing constraints.  For instance, studies conducted in China, Italy and the 
U.S. found that information asymmetry significantly limits the debt capacity of young 
firms (Carpenter and Rondi, 2000; Shirai; Bulan and Yan, 2007).  In addition, higher   3
financing constraints reduce the likelihood of starting a business in Thailand, especially 
in poorer regions (Paulson and Townsend, 2004).  In comparison, having an existing 
bank relationship increases the chances of starting a business with hired employees in 
Bosnia and improves the odds of survival for the new entrepreneur (Demirguc-Kunt, 
Klapper, and Panos, 2008).  Furthermore, according to studies of German and Canadian 
firms, a higher equity ratio in new firms has a particularly positive effect on investment in 
R&D, while such an effect has not been found in old firms (Müller and Zimmermann, 
2006; Baldwin et al., 2002). 
  Without access to formal financing, start-up firms might resort to informal 
sources.  For example, a previous study finds that family and friends provide affordable 
and accessible funding to Indian SME’s in start-up and growth phases (Allen, et al., 
2006).  Yet financing from friends and family might be “unreliable, untimely” and 
bearing “significant non-financial costs” (Djankov et al 2002, p. 9).  For instance, a study 
across 29 countries finds that firms choose informal financing over more formal routes 
when government officials are corrupt as a way to avoid paying bribes (Mehnaz and 
Wimpey, 2007); thus firms might be willing to bear the costs of informal financing if 
there is the added benefit of evading corruption.  A study of Chinese firms finds that 
while more firms use informal financing than bank financing, only bank financing is 
associated with higher growth rates (Ayyagari et al., 2007). 
  To the best of our knowledge there is no systematic cross-country study of the 
usage of financing by new and young firms.  Our study attempts to fill this gap by 
examining a vast firm-level database constructed from 170 World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys (WBES).  This database includes about 70,000 firms, most of which are small   4
and medium sized (SMEs), in 104 developing and developed countries, including many 
low-income countries.
1   We use this database to study what types of financing are 
important for new firms, relative to older firms.  Furthermore, we exploit the large cross-
country variation in our sample to test the effect of differences in institutions on new and 
young firms.  Specifically, our paper addresses two questions: (1) What is the 
relationship between firm age and the usage of external financing?; and (2) What is the 
differential impact of the business environment on the usage of financing by younger 
versus older firms?  
To address the first question we investigate the relationship between firm age and 
usage of different sources of financing, including local and foreign bank financing, 
leasing, trade credit, credit cards, family and friends, and informal lenders.  We 
specifically focus on the use of formal versus informal finance over the lifecycle of the 
firms, controlling for other firm characteristics.   
  To address the second question we look at the interactions of the country-level 
institutional characteristics and firm age. These interactions show whether the 
institutional environment has differential impact on new and young firms. We 
specifically focus on two factors that are important for formal financial contracts - the 
quality of the legal system (i.e. the rule of law) and availability of credit information.  
Previous literature shows that the level of development and institutional environment in a 
country can significantly impact the type of financing that firms are able to access (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2007, Brown, Chavis, Klapper 2008).  We extend this 
research and investigate whether particular features of the institutional environment are 
more or less important to young firms, relative to older firms.   
                                                           
1 The complete questionnaire and database is available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.   5
  A priori it is not clear whether a better business environment should be more or 
less important to younger firms, relative to older ones.  For example, the availability and 
quality of credit information might be more important to young firms because such 
information helps to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems, which are 
more present in younger firms.  Alternatively, new firm owners may not have a 
successful history or track record of borrowing and repayment, and hence availability of 
credit information might be less relevant for them.  Ultimately, this is the empirical 
question our data allows us to answer – whether or not a specific feature of the business 
environment is more or less important for young firms versus older firms.  
Our paper has two main contributions. First, we find that around the world 
younger firms use less formal (bank) finance and use more informal finance relative to 
older firms. Second, and more importantly, we find that the institutional environment is 
disproportionally more important for younger firms. Thus, the quality of the legal system 
and availability of credit information reduce the disadvantage placed by firm age and 
“even out” the playing field. These results suggest that asymmetric information problems, 
which present more of a constraint in access to finance for younger firms, can be 
alleviated by a better institutional environment. While we cannot rule out the selection 
bias in our level results (i.e. firms with access to formal finance might survive longer), 
our interaction results are not driven by the selection bias, since the interaction shows less 
difference in bank finance usage between younger and older firms in countries with better 
rule of law and credit information. 
 In this paper we consider firm age as a useful proxy for entrepreneurial firms. For 
example, Schumpeter wrote that a person is an entrepreneur “only when he actually   6
carries out new combinations and looses that character as soon as he has built up his 
business and settled into running it.” (Schumpeter, 1942).  Thus, new and young firms are 
more likely to retain the “entrepreneurial spirit” alluded to by Schumpeter. Other useful 
proxies for entrepreneur might be firms where an individual or family is the largest 
shareholder; whether the firm is managed by the owner; and if the firm is registered as a 
sole-proprietor (relative to a limited-liability partnership or corporation.)  In the later case, 
the person who starts the business, the entrepreneur, is actually running the business.  In 
the paper we focus on young firms as a proxy for ‘entrepreneurial’ firms, while also 
exploring other samples of firm ownership and legal types.   
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our data and 
descriptive statistics, Section 3 presents our regression results on the relationship between 
firm age and usage of financing, Section 4 presents our results on the differential impact 
of business environment on usage of financing by young versus older firms, Section 5 
presents robustness checks, and Section 6 concludes.   
 
 
2.  Data and Summary Statistics 
 
  The WBES dataset includes firms across multiple sectors (manufacturing, 
services, agriculture, and construction).  The database includes both quantitative and 
qualitative information on firm characteristics, including sources of finance, barriers to 
growth, access to infrastructure services, legal difficulties, and corruption.  The dataset 
also includes some measures of firm performance, such as multiple years of historical 
data on employment and sales.       7
  The database includes over 70,000 randomly sampled firm-level observations 
collected in 170 cross-sectional surveys in 104 countries, i.e. many countries include 
multiple years of data.
2  The database is globally represented, which we summarize by 
region:  Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR); East Asia (EA); South Asia (SA); Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (ECA); Latin America and Caribbean (LAC); and the Middle-East and 
Northern Africa (MENA).  The database also includes a few industrialized countries 
(IND).  Figure 1 shows the distribution of countries and observations, by region.  A 
notable difference between the two panels is that surveys in Africa include a relatively 
small number of firm observations and fewer countries have multiple survey years, while 
surveys in EA include a relatively large number of firms and include multiple years.  A 
complete list of countries and firm observations is shown in Appendix 1. 
  Figure 2, Panel A, shows the distribution of firms across income groups, which 
highlights the uniqueness of our dataset.  Unlike similar studies of entrepreneurial finance 
which focus on firms in the U.S. or other developed countries, firms in our database are 
distributed across income groups, with a focus on developing countries – which are most 
likely to face barriers in the business environment.  Our database includes 38 low-income 
and 37 lower-middle income countries, which account for over 73% of observations.  The 
surveys were conducted over the span for 7 years, 1999-2008.  Figure 2, Panel B, shows 
the distribution across firm years.  The majority of observations were collected in the past 
5 years. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of firms in our sample across sectors, ownership, 
and output markets.  We expect these firm characteristics to affect the usage of external 
                                                           
2 We are unable to control for whether an individual firm is included in multiple survey years, although the 
likelihood of a firm being included more than once is insignificant.     8
financing, relative to other young firms.  First, some surveys focused exclusively on 
manufacturing companies, so in part by design, the majority of firms in our sample are 
manufacturing firms (60%), followed by services (30%) and construction (6%).  Since 
manufacturing companies are likely to be more capital intensive, sources of 
entrepreneurial finance should be particularly illustrative of country-level barriers to 
access to credit.  Next, we find 4% of firms with state-ownership (particularly in lower 
income countries) and 5% with foreign ownership.  Both types of firms might receive 
preferential access to financing.  Finally, about 23% of firms in our sample are identified 
as exporters, which might have greater access to overseas customer and bank financing.   
  Importantly for our analysis, the WBES data is a random sampling of firms.  An 
important caveat, however, is that many country surveys do not include new firms:  79% 
of surveys have a minimum firm age of one; 8% a minimum firm age two; 4% a 
minimum firm age three, and 9% a minimum firm age four.
3  Therefore, summary tables 
include an increasing number of country and firm observations along the age dimension.  
Figure 4 shows the distribution of total firms, by age.  We find that over 8% of the total 
sample is three years old or younger, while 58% of all firms are twelve years or younger.  
The largest number of observations is for age four, which includes observations from all 
country/year surveys, regardless of survey-specific minimum firm age.   
   
2.1 Variation in usage of financial products 
 
  We begin by examining whether age is related to usage of a bank line of credit or 
overdraft facility (L/C).  Figure 5 shows that usage of L/Cs increases with firm age, from 
                                                           
3 In robustness regressions, reported in section 5, we discuss our results using only surveys that include one 
year old firms, i.e. eliminating the sampling bias in some countries.   9
about 20% of new firms to over 40% of firms age 6 (and older).  This supports the 
hypothesis that access to bank and other sources of formal financing is related to firm age. 
Next, we observe the complete distribution of sources for working capital and 
new investment financing, by age.  Table 1 shows the percentage of firms that use select 
types of financing for either working capital or new investment – disaggregated by 
financing source and aggregated by financing categories –  by firm age. Throughout the 
paper we focus on four distinct categories of external financing sources:  informal 
sources and family and friends (“Informal Finance”); foreign and domestic bank 
financing (“Bank Finance”); “Leasing”, “Trade Credit”; and “New Equity”, which 
includes equity, grants, and other sources.
4 The columns do not sum to 100% since most 
firms use more than one source of financing.  
The percentage of firms using retained earnings is fairly consistent across the age 
categories.  Similarly there is no clear relationship between firm age and the use of new 
equity or trade credit.  However, like the availability of a line of credit, both the use of 
bank financing and leasing are more likely as firms mature.  The relationship between 
age and informal financing runs in the opposite direction.  Not only does the likelihood of 
using informal financing decrease over time, there is also a sharp decrease in these 
sources during the first few years after a firm begins operations.  This is true for both 
financing from friends and family and informal sources.   
Table 2 shows the percentage of total working capital (Panel A) and New 
Investment (Panel B) financing provided by each of the sources of financing (i.e. the 
                                                           
4 We have also experimented with aggregating leasing and trade credit into one category that could be 
thought of as “operational finance,” following Allen et al. (2005) and Beck, et al. (2006). Our results were 
not materially affected and available on request. We choose to report leasing and trade credit separately 
because leasing is asset-backed finance, while trade credit is largely “relationship  based.”     10
columns do not sum to 100% because credit cards are excluded).  The primary source of 
working capital financing for all firm ages is retained earnings.  In other words, on 
average, firm in all size buckets rely primarily on their own funds for over half of their 
financing needs, which is in line with the pecking order theory of capital structure.   
However, the reliance on different types of external financing shows a monotonic 
relationship with age: for instance, older firms use a larger percentage of bank finance 
and leasing and rely less on informal sources.  As firms mature, they might shift their 
dependence from informal sources of finance to more formal sources.
5  Trade credit is 
also an important source of working capital financing for all firms, and becomes slightly 
more important as firms get older.  Young firms are more likely to receive infusions of 
new equity capital, relative to older firms (however, these are likely to be owner’s own 
funds).   
    Table 3 shows the percentage of firms using the four aggregated financing 
categories, by age and country-level income groupings.  Across income groups, new 
firms seem to have relatively equal usage of bank financing, with the exception of low-
income countries (that are generally associated with less developed financial systems and 
hence lower availability of financing for all age groups).  Leasing is used significantly 
more in countries with middle-high and high income. Trade credit use does not seem to 
be systematically related to income and age. However, the use of informal finance tends 
to be higher in lower-income countries, across all age groups.   
Furthermore, the use of bank financing is increasing with age in all 4 income 
groups, and almost doubles by the time firms reach 13 years, relative to new firms. In 
parallel, the use of informal finance gradually decreases with age in all income groups. 
                                                           
5  In addition, firms with access to formal financing may be more likely to survive (to an older age).      11
Panel B suggests that the use of asset-based operations finance is relatively consistent 
across income groups, with the exception that very young firms in high-income countries 
seem to use significantly more leasing and trade credit.  This might be explained by the 
importance of leasing for new firms in countries with developed financial markets. 
 
2.2 Other loan and firm characteristics 
  Table 4 shows summary statistics of loan characteristics.  We do not find a 
notable difference between the use of collateral, the percentage of loan size collateralized, 
interest rates, or maturity across firm age.  However, new firms are less likely to have 
audited accounts. 
  Table 5 shows summary statistics of the variables used in our econometric 
specifications.  Panel A shows summary statistics of all firms.  (Complete variable 
definitions are shown in Appendix 2).  The average firm age in our sample is 15 years, 
with a maximum age capped at 80 years.  27% of firms are identified as “Micro”, with 
less than 10 employees; 39% are identified as “Small”, with less than 50 employees; and 
the remaining firms as “Medium/Large”. In our sample 23% of firms are exporters, 48% 
are corporations, and 52% have audited statements.  Finally, 4% of firms are identified as 
state-owned and 5% as foreign-owned.   
  Table 5, Panel B, shows summary statistics disaggregated by firms (i) less than or 
equal to five years old and (ii) firms older than five years.  These preliminary statistics 
show large and significant differences between younger and older firms.  For instance, 
young firms are significantly almost twice as likely to be micro (defined as less than 10 
employees) and significantly less likely to be exporters.   
     12
3.   The Relationship between Age and Usage of External Financing 
In this section we investigate the relationship between our four main categories of 
external finance and age.  We exclude firms that use zero external financing, since we are 
unable to disentangle whether these firms rely on internal financing by choice or because 
they have been rejected by external creditors.  Table 6 reports regressions for each of the 
sources of finance defined above: bank finance, leasing, trade credit, and informal 
finance.  In this table, the dependent variables is equal to one if the firm uses a type of 
financing for either working capital or new investment, and zero otherwise.  In addition, 
we include a dummy which is equal to one if a firm uses a line of credit or overdraft 
facility.  In our data, 44% of firms have a line of credit, compared to 32% of firms that 
use bank financing; the correlation between line of credit and bank financing is about 
0.50, and significant at 1%. We estimate the model by probit with standard errors 
clustered by country and year (because several countries have more than one survey).  
The regressions control for a number of firm characteristics, such as dummies 
indicating micro and small sized firms (medium/large firms are the omitted category), 
exporters, firms with audited statements, legal status (corporation vs. unlimited liability 
and other types), and state and foreign ownership.  We also include dummies for sector 
fixed effects (manufacturing, services, and construction), country-level fixed-effects, and 
survey year.  The key variable of interest is log of firm age. 
The results are similar to the univariate results discussed before: bank finance is 
gradually increasing with age, while informal finance is gradually decreasing with age. 
The usage of line of credit behaves similarly to the usage of bank finance. We do not find 
a significant pattern for leasing finance, while trade credit use is slightly increasing with   13
age (and the probable length of supplier relationships). The multivariate regressions show 
that these patterns are not driven by different composition of firms across countries, or 
different country-level characteristics (which are captured by firm-level control variables 
and country dummies).  
To illustrate these results further, we repeat similar regressions but include 
dummies for firm age for each age level, between 1 and 15 years.  In other words, we 
replace log age with 15 age dummies, while controlling for the same set of firm-level 
controls and sector/country/year dummies. The results are presented graphically in Figure 
6.  These graphs show that coefficients are gradually increasing with age for bank finance 
and gradually decreasing for informal finance.  The results for leasing (not shown) and 
trade credit   do now show any strong pattern, in line with earlier results.  
We also include an indicator variable for a firm’s legal status. Firms that are 
classified as sole-proprietors are more likely to be run by the founder – the entrepreneur. 
Thus, we use sole-proprietor indicator as another proxy for entrepreneurial firms. We find 
similar results to those found for firm age: sole-proprietor firms are less likely to use 
formal financing and more likely rely on informal sources. Interestingly, sole proprietors 
are also less likely to use leasing and trade credit finance (significant at 10% level). These 
results corroborate our main finding that younger and more entrepreneurial firms face 
more severe financing constraints and hence have to rely more on informal finance. The 
results on age are robust to excluding the sole proprietor and partnership dummies from 
the regression. 
  
   14
4.  The Role of the Business Environment  
  In this section we look at the relationship between country-level institutional 
characteristics, focusing on institutional factors such as rule of law and availability of 
credit information, and firm age.   
A priori it is not clear whether better business environment should be more or less 
important to younger firms, relative to older ones.  For example, the availability and 
quality of credit information might be more important to young firms because such 
information helps to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems, which are 
more present in younger firms.  This would be particularly true in countries with more 
developed credit information infrastructures, where banks might use more sophisticated 
credit scoring technology that also include the personal credit history of the entrepreneur.  
This would be particularly beneficial for new firm owners who may not have a successful 
history or track record of commercial borrowing and repayment.  Alternatively, loans to 
new entrepreneurs might depend more on “soft” information and relationships, while 
older firms might benefit relatively more from an established credit history. 
  Similarly, rule of law may be more important for older firms, which are more 
likely to rely on the formal legal system for conflict resolution.  Or, it might be more 
important for younger firms that don’t have a proven track record, visibility, large 
reputation capital, and other means of enforcing contracts.  Ultimately, this is the 
empirical question we are looking to answer – whether or not a specific feature of the 
business environment is more or less important for young versus older firms.  
  Table 7 presents our regression results.  The model is the same as in Table 6 and 
all control variables are included, except for country dummies.  Instead, we include firm   15
age, a country-level indicator of the business environment, and the interaction of age and 
the business environment measure.  In addition, we include six regional dummies (Africa, 
South Asia, etc.) and log GDP per capita for those regressions that do not include country 
fixed effects.  Panels A and B present our results with rule of Law and Credit Information, 
respectively (additional coefficients, not shown, are similar to those reported in Table 6).   
  First, we observe that Rule of Law and Credit Information have a positive impact 
on bank finance and a negative impact on informal finance.  This suggests that firms in 
countries with better rule of law are more likely to enter into formal credit contract, and 
hence less likely have to rely on informal contracts. Credit information supports the use 
of formal credit contracts as it allows banks to evaluate the creditworthiness of the 
borrower.  
  The interaction of Rule of Law and Firm Age is negative for Bank Finance, and 
Leasing, but not significant for other types of finance.  Thus, relative to older firms, 
younger firms are more likely to use bank credit and leasing in countries with better rule 
of law, than they are in countries with worse rule of law.  In other words, while younger 
firms are less likely to use bank financing and leasing than older firms in all countries, 
they are even less likely to use bank financing in countries with weak rule of law. As we 
saw before, leasing is almost non-existent in countries with poor rule of law.  
  Alternatively, since the interaction term is symmetric, the results might be 
interpreted to suggest that rule of law is more important for younger firms.  It might be 
the case that older firms can rely on alternative mechanisms, such as higher visibility, 
track record, reputation, etc., and rely less on rule of law to obtain credit.    16
We find no significant interactive effect of rule of law for either informal finance 
or trade credit.   Instead, our regressions suggest that young firms use more informal 
sources of financing and less trade credit finance, regardless of the legal environment.   
Next, we repeat the process with credit information as our country-level 
institutional measure in Panel B.  The results show that credit information has a positive 
effect for the use of bank finance (although not significant at conventional levels) and 
positive and significant for leasing. It is negative (not significant) for trade credit and 
negative for informal finance.  Thus, credit information supports the use of bank finance 
and leasing, and reduces reliance of firms on informal finance.  
Most importantly, the interaction of credit information and firm age is significant 
for bank finance.  These interaction terms suggest that credit information is more 
important for the availability of bank financing for younger firms.  These results are 
again in line with the argument that older firms have other means of demonstrating 
creditworthiness, while younger firms are more reliant on the availability and quality of 
credit information through a public or private credit bureau.  
  Interestingly, the credit information interaction term is also significant for 
informal finance, suggesting that in countries with better credit information the difference 
between younger and older firms in the usage of informal finance is smaller than it is in 
countries with worse credit information.  This is a mirror result that suggests that 
informal finance is a second-best substitute to formal finance – when firms have more 
access to formal finance, they cut their usage of informal finance. There is no differential 
impact of better credit information on the use of leasing and trade credit by younger firms. 
This could be because these types of finance do not rely as much on credit information as   17
bank finance: leasing uses the quality of the asset and trade credit is usually based on the 
relationship between suppliers and customers.  
  All results are robust to the inclusion of country dummies (and the exclusion of 
rule of law or credit information variables).  We have also investigated other factors 
affecting the business environment, such as creditor rights, cost of contract enforcement, 
and rate of debt recovery.  The results on these indicators have consistent signs, but are 
not significant at conventional levels, and therefore are not reported.  
Overall, our results suggest that better rule of law and credit information 
infrastructures are relatively more important for younger firms in increasing their use of 
formal bank finance and decreasing their use of informal finance.  
  
5.  Robustness Checks 
Until now, we have used binary dependent variables, i.e. equal to one if the firm 
uses the type of financing and zero otherwise.  However, the WBES also collects 
information on the proportion that each source of finance contributes to working capital 
and new investment.  We use this information for further tests.  In other words, we create 
dependent variables equal to the sum of the total proportion for each financing source for 
new investment:  Bank financing (the sum of the percentage of total new investment 
financing from local or foreign banks); Trade Credit; and Informal Finance (the sum of 
new investment financing from informal sources and friends or family).   We are unable 
to test the total percentage of leasing financing because of the high proportion of 
censored observations (equal to zero).  We estimate regressions by Tobit model since our 
dependent variables are limited to between 0% and 100%.    18
Our results for new investment are shown in Table 8.  We find that age is 
positively and significantly related to the percentage of Bank Finance while significantly 
and negatively related to the percentage of Operations and Informal finance.   
Furthermore, the economic significance of age on the amount of bank financing is large, 
relative to its impact on operations and informal financing, which though statistically 
significant are small economically.  Second, we confirm that rule of law is significantly 
and positively related to greater usage of formal financing – from bank and operational 
lenders – and significantly and negatively related to the size of informal finance.  As 
before, we find that the interaction of rule of law and bank finance is negative and 
significant. In other words, we find that weak legal environments significantly magnify 
the disparities between usage of bank financing between young and old firms.  However, 
the relationship with informal and operations finance is insignificant.  We find similar 
results for the percentage of working capital financing and the interaction with credit 
information (not shown).  
Second, our results are very robust to various sub-samples of countries and firms.  
As discussed earlier, an important caveat of enterprise surveys that is relevant for our 
analysis is the sampling design, which in some countries excluded firms under 2, 3 or 4 
years old.  Thus, the very youngest and hence most entrepreneurial firms are simply not 
sampled in some countries.  To eliminate the possibility that this sampling feature will 
bias our results, we reproduced all our results using only surveys (i.e. countries) with firm 
minimum age of one year.  Our baseline results reported in Table 6 are even stronger in 
this sample, even though the sample size is significantly reduced (not reported).  Again,   19
we find that younger firms are less likely to use a line of credit or bank finance and more 
likely to use informal sources of financing.  
Next, we find that our results are robust to excluding all transition countries (i.e. 
all Business Environment and Enterprise Performance (BEEP) surveys), in which 
privatization history might contaminate the firm age.  In other words, firms that have 
been privatized may appear as being new/young, i.e. they might have been recently re-
registered, while in fact they are “revamped” old firms.  Our results are also robust to 
excluding high-income countries and only considering low and lower middle income 
countries.   
In separate regressions we reproduced our results on firms that report having a 
single establishment, which eliminates from the sample firms with a domestic or foreign 
parent that might provide financing.  Again, we obtain robust results for age and single 
proprietor dummy.  
Finally, in Table 9 we examine the smaller subsample of firms where an 
individual or family is the largest shareholder.  Our main results are robust.  Furthermore, 
for this sample of firms we can test the impact of (i) the owner also being the manager 
and (ii) having a female principal owner.  We find that after controlling for other firm 
characteristics, owner/manager is only significant in predicting less usage of a line of 
credit.  However, we find that firms with female principle owners are significantly less 
likely to use bank financing and significantly more likely to use informal finance.   
Furthermore, as shown in column 5, the interaction of firm age and female ownership is 
significantly negative, suggesting that female owners of young firms are significantly 
more likely (relative to male owners) to use informal financing.  Although we leave a   20
more rigorous analysis to future research, this result is consistent with the results of 
Sabarwal and Terell (2008) that finds that the return to scale of female owned firms is 
significantly larger than men’s and that the main reason for the sub-optimal size of 
women owned firms is likely to be barriers to formal financing. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we systematically study the use of different financing sources for 
new and young firms.  We use a unique dataset from over 170 surveys, which contain 
about 70,000 firms, most of which are small and medium sized (SMEs) in 104 
developing and developed countries, including many low-income countries.  We use this 
dataset to examine corporate financing decisions: First, the relationship between firm age 
and sources of external financing, and second, the differential impact of business 
environment on access to financing by young versus older firms.  
As expected, we confirm that in all countries younger firms have less reliance on 
bank financing and more reliance on informal financing. The relationship with leasing 
and trade credit is less associated with firm age.   
Most interestingly, we explore the interaction of firm age and the business 
environment and the relative impact of the business environment on a young firm’s mix 
of financing sources.  We find that younger firms are more likely to use bank finance in 
countries with better rule of law.  While younger firms are less likely to use bank 
financing in all countries, they have worse access in countries with poor rule of law.  
Similarly, we find that credit information has a differentially positive effect on the use of 
bank finance by young firms; this might highlight the importance of personal credit   21
histories for entrepreneurs without business track records.  In parallel, we find that the 
use of informal finance by young firms’ decreases in countries with better credit 
information, reaffirming that informal finance is a second-best substitute to formal 
finance.  Overall, our results suggest that improvements to the legal environment and 
credit information infrastructure are disproportionately beneficial for promoting access to 
formal finance by young firms.    22
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Figure 1: Distributions of Surveyed Countries and Firm Observations, by Region 
       Figure 1a: Distribution of countries         Figure 1b: Distribution of observations 
 
Figure 2:  Distribution of Total Firms, by Country-Level Income and Year 
Figure 3:  Distribution of Total Firms, by Sector, Ownership, and Output Markets 
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Figure 4:  Distribution of Total Firm Observations, by Age 
 
 





































































Table 1: Financing Patterns (Working Capital or New Investment), by Age  
 
Panel A shows the percentage of firms that use the financing source for either Working Capital or New 
Investment (i.e. the reported percentage of total financing is greater than zero).  Panel B shows the 
percentage of firms that use the financing source, by aggregated categories:  “Bank Finance” includes local 
and foreign banks; “Leasing”; “Trade Credit”; “Informal Finance”, which includes family and friends and 
informal sources; and “New Equity” includes equity, grants, and other sources. 
 
  1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8  9-10  11-12  13+  Total 
Panel A: By Financing Type 
Retained Earnings  84.6% 85.0% 83.4% 85.0% 85.1% 85.8% 82.5% 83.8% 
Local Banks  17.2%  19.8%  24.9%  28.0%  27.3%  30.8%  36.9%  30.1% 
Foreign Banks  1.8% 2.0% 2.1% 4.8% 5.0% 2.2% 3.5% 3.3% 
Leasing  2.6%  4.7%  7.1%  6.4%  6.9%  7.5%  7.2%  6.6% 
Trade Credit  29.7% 22.1% 26.8% 21.4% 29.0% 26.3% 28.8% 26.8% 
Credit Cards  1.2%  1.5%  1.8%  2.0%  2.2%  2.5%  2.4%  2.1% 
Family & Friends  22.1% 15.1% 14.0% 13.0% 13.6% 10.4%  8.7%  11.8% 
Informal Sources  10.3%  6.8%  4.4%  4.2%  3.4%  3.0%  2.5%  3.9% 
Grants  2.7% 2.4% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 4.1% 3.2% 
Equity  9.5%  10.1%  9.5%  10.0%  10.3%  10.0%  9.5%  9.7% 
Other  4.2% 5.7% 8.1% 6.5% 6.5% 5.2% 8.9% 7.4% 
Panel B: By Financing Category 
Bank Financing  18.3%  20.9%  26.2%  29.4%  31.3%  32.0%  38.7%  31.8% 
Leasing  2.6% 4.7% 7.1% 6.4% 6.9% 7.5% 7.2% 6.6% 
Trade Credit  29.7%  22.1%  26.8%  21.4%  29.0%  26.3%  28.8%  26.8% 
Informal Finance  30.9% 19.8% 16.4% 15.3% 15.6% 12.2% 10.4% 14.3% 
New Equity  15.3%  17.1%  19.1%  18.0%  18.3%  16.8%  20.9%  19.0% 
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Table 2: Distribution of Firm Financing (Percentages), by Age 
 
This table shows the percentage of total Working Capital (Panel A) or New Investment (Panel B) financing 
provided by each of these sources.  “Bank Finance” includes local and foreign banks; “Leasing”; “Trade 
Credit”; “Informal Finance”, which includes family and friends and informal sources; and “New Equity” 
includes equity, grants, and other sources.  Columns do not sum to 100% as credit cards are excluded. 
 
  1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8  9-10  11-12  13+  Total 
Panel A: Working Capital 
Retained Earnings  61.4% 68.0% 63.9% 66.9% 65.2% 66.2% 59.6% 63.0% 
Bank Financing  8.7%  8.4%  9.7%  11.0%  11.1%  11.4%  15.7%  12.6% 
Leasing  0.3% 0.6% 0.5% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 0.7% 0.7% 
Trade Credit  12.3%  7.1%  11.1%  7.6%  8.8%  9.0%  11.0%  9.8% 
Informal Finance  8.2% 6.6% 5.8% 4.7% 4.8% 3.9% 3.2% 4.5% 
New Equity  8.6%  9.0%  9.4%  8.7%  8.8%  8.0%  9.0%  8.9% 
Panel B: New Investment 
Retained Earnings  65.8% 65.6% 65.0% 66.2% 61.7% 64.0% 59.2% 62.4% 
Bank Financing  9.3%  9.5%  11.9%  13.4%  16.4%  17.4%  19.9%  15.9% 
Leasing  1.3% 2.1% 2.6% 2.4% 2.9% 3.0% 3.1% 2.7% 
Trade Credit  2.8%  2.8%  4.5%  2.7%  3.6%  2.9%  3.4%  3.3% 
Informal Finance  10.1%  8.7% 5.3% 4.4% 4.4% 3.4% 2.8% 4.5% 
New Equity  10.2%  10.4%  10.0%  10.3%  10.3%  8.3%  10.8%  10.3% 
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Table 3: Aggregated Financing Patterns, by Country Income-Level and Age 
This table shows the percentage of firms that use the financing source for either Working Capital or New 
Investment (i.e. the reported percentage of total financing is greater than zero), aggregated by income-level.  
Panel A shows the percentage of firms that use “Bank Finance”, defined as local and foreign banks; Panel 
B shows the percentage of firms that use Leasing, Panel C shows Trade Credit and Panel D shows the 
percentage of firms that use “Informal Finance”, defined as family and friends and informal sources. 
 
    1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8  9-10  11-12  13+ 
Panel A: Bank Finance 
High  20.0% 31.7% 32.7% 40.6% 38.3% 44.7% 45.3% 
Upper-Middle  24.5%  22.7%  27.7%  30.9%  31.7%  33.1%  38.9% 
Lower-Middle  21.3% 20.0% 25.2% 28.8% 33.0% 33.0% 40.1% 
Low  14.7%  20.1%  25.2%  26.3%  25.4%  24.8%  32.1% 
Panel B: Leasing 
High  10.0% 12.0% 12.9% 16.0% 18.8% 22.4% 21.3% 
Upper-Middle  7.1%  14.4%  14.0%  14.3%  16.0%  15.0%  10.4% 
Lower-Middle  3.3% 3.0% 3.2% 3.8% 3.3% 4.2% 5.0% 
Low  0.9%  1.9%  7.5%  1.9%  1.8%  1.4%  1.5% 
Panel C: Trade Credit 
High  40.0% 13.6% 18.0% 23.3% 23.7% 21.1% 25.6% 
Upper-Middle  27.0%  26.1%  24.0%  22.7%  25.0%  23.6%  26.6% 
Lower-Middle  28.9% 17.0% 28.1% 17.6% 29.1% 24.0% 28.0% 
Low  30.7%  28.6%  28.4%  27.4%  34.1%  36.4%  34.8% 
Panel D: Informal Finance 
High  6.7% 9.7%  10.0%  9.4% 8.1% 9.8% 5.9% 
Upper-Middle  23.4%  20.7%  16.8%  14.8%  13.1%  12.2%  10.5% 
Lower-Middle  23.3% 20.7% 16.6% 14.0% 17.6% 11.0% 11.4% 
Low  38.5%  19.3%  17.3%  20.0%  16.1%  15.6%  10.0% 
 
 
 Table 4: Summary Statistics of Loan Characteristics, by Firm Age 
 
  1-2  3-4 5-6 7-8  9-10  11-12  13+  Total 
Loan requires collateral  
(1= Yes; 0 = No)  76.2%  76.7%  78.3%  73.4%  80.6%  80.0%  75.0%  76.4% 
 
% Value of collateral , 
relative  to  loan  value  129.0%  131.7% 192.9% 130.3% 130.5% 137.8% 137.5% 141.4% 
 
Interest rate  13.4%  13.9%  14.5%  13.2%  14.4%  14.1%  12.7%  13.4% 
 
Loan  duration  (months)  34.7  33.2 32.2 35.2 31.5 32.3 36.2 34.5 
 
Audited financial statements  42.2%  37.1%  43.4%  51.7%  53.5%  50.1%  61.1%  52.6%   29
Table 5: Summary Statistics and Percent of Firms, by Category 
 
Complete variable descriptions are shown in Appendix 2.  Panel A shows summary statistics for all firms 
that report financing sources.  Panel B shows summary statistics for  firms that are (i) less than or equal to 
five years and (ii) greater than five years old.  The last column shows t-statistics for mean differences.  
Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%,and 1%, respectively.  
 
 
  Panel A: All Firms 
(68,419 Obs.)   Panel B: Use External Finance?  
(Mean) 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.    Firm age  
 ≤ 5  Firm age > 5   
Firm Age  15.9  15.3    3.6  19.4   
Percent of Firms in each Category 
Micro  27%  45%     44%  23%  *** 
Small 39%  49%      35%  40%  *** 
Medium/Large  34%  47%     21%  37%  *** 
Sole Proprietorship  27%  44%     38%  24%  *** 
Partnership  15%  36%     16%  15%  * 
Owner Manager  32%  47%     32%  32%    
Exporter  23%  42%     16%  25%  *** 
Audit 52%  50%      39%  55%  *** 
Foreign Owned  5%  23%     4%  6%  *** 
State Owned   4%  19%     1%  4%  *** 
Low Income  25%  43%     36%  22%  *** 
Lower Middle   46%  50%     44%  46%  *** 
Upper Middle   22%  41%     15%  24%  *** 
High Income  7%  26%     5%  8%  *** 
Manufacturing  58%  49%     43%  62%  *** 
Services 32%  47%      44%  29%  *** 
Agro-industry  2%  13%     3%  1%  *** 
Construction 7%  25%      8%  6%  *** 
Africa  16%  37%     22%  15%  *** 
EA 13%  33%      13%  12%  * 
ECA  38%  48%     45%  36%  *** 
LAC 17%  38%      11%  19%  *** 
MENA  7%  26%     4%  8%  *** 
SA 4%  19%      3%  4%  *** 
IND  5%  21%     3%  5%  ***   30
Table 6:  Is there a Relationship Between Sources of Finance and Firm Age? 
 
Table 6 reports probit estimates with country fixed effects.  The dependent variable in the first column is a 
dummy equal to one if the firm reports using a line of credit or overdraft facility; the second column is a 
dummy equal to one if the firm uses local or foreign bank financing (“Bank Finance”), the third column is a 
dummy equal to one if the firm uses leasing; the fourth column is a dummy equal to one if the firm uses 
trade credit, and the fifth column is a dummy equal to one if the firm uses informal financing.  We exclude 
firms that do not use any source of external finance (i.e. retained earnings equals 100%).  All variables are 
defined in Appendix 2.  All regressions include sector fixed effects (manufacturing, services, and 
construction), country-level fixed-effects, and survey year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered by 
country and year.  Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) 
   Line of Credit  Bank Finance  Leasing  Trade Credit  Informal 
Finance 
Ln Firm Age  0.039  0.039  -0.001  0.017  -0.053 
   [0.001]***  [0.011]**  [0.671]  [0.082]*  [0.000]*** 
Micro -0.257  -0.221  -0.049  -0.073  0.149 
   [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.003]***  [0.000]*** 
Small -0.172  -0.147  -0.025  -0.002  0.054 
   [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.945]  [0.012]** 
Sole 
Proprietorship  -0.047 -0.076  -0.018  -0.039  0.072 
   [0.252]  [0.000]***  [0.015]**  [0.083]*  [0.000]*** 
Partnership -0.077  -0.024  -0.001  0.028  0.021 
   [0.003]***  [0.412]  [0.888]  [0.498]  [0.119] 
Other Legal Type  -0.034  -0.010  -0.004  -0.014  -0.030 
   [0.212]  [0.686]  [0.452]  [0.542]  [0.278] 
Exporter 0.044  0.031  0.005  0.015  -0.018 
   [0.001]***  [0.059]*  [0.264]  [0.634]  [0.178] 
Audit 0.088  0.046  0.009  -0.003  -0.023 
   [0.000]***  [0.040]**  [0.096]*  [0.851]  [0.091]* 
Foreign Owned  -0.008  0.039  -0.012  0.063  -0.140 
   [0.823]  [0.553]  [0.049]**  [0.513]  [0.000]*** 
State Owned  -0.027  -0.179  -0.037  -0.007  -0.100 
   [0.655]  [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.789]  [0.000]*** 
Observations 37,434 37,083 27,485  37,049 37,061 
Pseudo R
2 0.28  0.19  0.21  0.20  0.14   31
Figure 6:Coefficients on the Relationship Between Sources of Finance and Firm Age 
 
Figure 6 reports the coefficients from Probit estimations with country fixed-effects, and firm, industry, and 
year dummies as shown in Table 6.  Each graph reports coefficients for the age dummies 1 to 15. 
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Table 7: The Effect of the Business Environment on the Relationship Between 
Sources of Finance and Firm Age 
 
Table 7 reports probit estimates.  In Panel A we interact sources of financing with Rule of Law and in Panel 
B with Credit Information index.  We exclude firms that do not use any source of external finance (i.e. 
retained earnings equals 100%).  All regressions include firm-level dummies: Micro, Small, Exporter, Corp, 
Audit, Foreign Own, and State Own.  All variables are defined in Appendix 2.  All regressions include 
firm-level sector fixed effects (manufacturing, services, and construction) and survey year fixed effects.  
Regressions without country fixed effects contain country-level regional fixed effects and Ln GDP per 
capita. Standard errors are clustered by country and year.  Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Rule of Law 
 
   (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
   (i) Bank Finance  (ii) Leasing 
Ln Firm Age  0.036  0.028  0.033  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
[0.006]*** [0.027]**  [0.025]**  [0.502]  [0.710]  [0.807] 
Rule of Law  0.003  0.076     0.094 0.116     
[0.960] [0.178]     [0.000]*** [0.000]***     
Rule of Law *      -0.030 -0.030     -0.009 -0.006 
   Ln Age      [0.054]* [0.076]*     [0.184] [0.099]* 
 
Country Fixed 
Effects  No No Yes No  No  Yes 
Observations 37,030  37,030  37,048  24,727 24,727 27,450 
Psuedo-R2 0.12  0.12  0.19  0.14  0.14  0.22 
  (iii) Trade Credit  (iv) Informal Finance 
Ln Firm Age  0.036  0.028  0.033  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
Rule of Law  -0.052  -0.033     -0.073 -0.078     
[0.326] [0.564]     [0.000]*** [0.013]**     
Rule of Law *      -0.007 -0.002     0.002 0.009 
   Ln Age      [0.519] [0.906]     [0.828] [0.404] 
 
Country Fixed 
Effects  No No Yes No  No  Yes 
Observations 37,029  37,029  37,014  35,935 35,935 37,026 
Psuedo-R2 0.12  0.12  0.20  0.11  0.11  0.14   33
Table 7: The Effect of the Business Environment on the Relationship Between 
Sources of Finance and Firm Age (Cont.) 
 
Panel B. Credit Information 
 
 
   (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
   (i) Bank Finance  (ii) Leasing 
Ln Firm Age  0.035  0.090  0.102  -0.001  0.000  -0.004 
[0.007]*** [0.004]***  [0.018]**  [0.703]  [0.999]  [0.487] 
Credit Information  -0.006  0.034     0.013 0.014     
[0.614] [0.132]     [0.017]** [0.068]*     
Credit Information      -0.017 -0.019     0.000 0.001 
   * Ln  Age     [0.019]** [0.046]**     [0.860] [0.584] 
 
Country Fixed 
Effects  No No Yes No  No  Yes 
Observations 37,065  37,065  37,065  24,762 24,762 27,485 
Psuedo-R2 0.12  0.12  0.19  0.14  0.14  0.22 
  (iii) Trade Credit  (iv) Informal Finance 
Ln Firm Age  0.004  0.005  0.022  -0.051  -0.095  -0.098 
[0.706] [0.829]  [0.420]  [0.000]***  [0.006]***  [0.003]*** 
Credit Information  -0.020  -0.019     -0.005 -0.036     
  [0.181] [0.298]     [0.394] [0.032]**     
Credit Information   
     -0.001 -0.002     0.014 0.014 
  * Ln Age      [0.922] [0.792]     [0.066]* [0.047]** 
 
Country Fixed 
Effects  No No Yes No  No  Yes 
Observations 37,064  37,064  37,031  35,970 35,970 37,043 
Psuedo-R2 0.12  0.12  0.20  0.11  0.11  0.14 Table 8: The Effect of the Business Environment on the Relationship Between 
Penetration of Finance and Firm Age 
 
Table 8 reports tobit estimates.  Marginal effects based on the mean level of the independent variables and 
for the unconditional value of the dependent variable are reported.  Dependent variables equal the sum of 
the percentage of financing used for net investment (from 0 to 100).  The dependent variable in Panel A is 
the sum of new investment financing from local and foreign bank financing (“Bank Finance”), Panel B is 
new investment financing from trade credit, and Panel C is the sum of new investment financing from 
informal financing sources.  We exclude firms that do not use any source of external finance (i.e. retained 
earnings equals 100%).  All regressions use firm-level dummies: Micro, Small, Exporter, Corp, Audit, 
Foreign Own, and State Own.  All variables are defined in Appendix 2.  All regressions include firm-level 
sector fixed effects (manufacturing, services, and construction) and survey year fixed effects.  Regressions 
without country fixed effects contain country-level regional fixed effects and Ln GDP per capita.  Asterisks 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Panel A: Bank Finance 
Ln Firm Age  0.030 0.031 0.027 
  [0.036]** [0.046]** [0.064]* 
Rule of Law    -0.002 0.067 
    [0.966] [0.237] 
Rule of Law *     -0.027 
Ln Age     [0.059]* 
     
Country Fixed Effects  Yes No No 
Observations  20,182 20,160 20,160 
Psuedo-R
2  0.11 0.05 0.05 
Panel B: Trade Credit 
Ln Firm Age  -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 
  [0.069]* [0.022]**  [0.003]*** 
Rule of Law    -0.022 -0.004 
   [0.038]** [0.702] 
Rule of Law *      -0.007 
Ln Age      [0.018]** 
      
Country Fixed Effects  Yes No No 
Observations 20,220  20,198  20,198 
Psuedo-R
2      
Panel C: Informal Finance 
Ln Firm Age  -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 
  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Rule of Law    -0.043 -0.039 
    [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Rule of Law *     -0.002 
Ln Age     [0.732] 
     
Country Fixed Effects  Yes No No 
Observations  20,220 20,198 20,198 
Psuedo-R
2  0.17 0.12 0.12   1
Table 9: The Relationship Between Sources of Finance and Firm – 
When an Individual or Family is the Largest Shareholder 
 
Table 6 reports probit estimates with country fixed effects for the subsample of firms where an individual 
or family is the largest shareholder.  The dependent variable in the first column is a dummy equal to one if 
the firm reports using a line of credit or overdraft facility; the second column is a dummy equal to one if the 
firm uses local or foreign bank financing (“Bank Finance”), the third column is a dummy equal to one if the 
firm uses leasing; the fourth column is a dummy equal to one if the firm uses trade credit, and the fifth 
column is a dummy equal to one if the firm uses informal financing.  We exclude firms that do not use any 
source of external finance (i.e. retained earnings equals 100%).  All variables are defined in Appendix 2.  
All regressions include sector fixed effects (manufacturing, services, and construction), country-level fixed-
effects, and survey year fixed effects.  Standard errors  are clustered by country and year.  Asterisks *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 




Ln Firm Age  0.037  0.035  0.001  -0.008  -0.041  -0.0306 
   [0.004]***  [0.004]***  [0.884]  [0.424]  [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
Micro -0.280  -0.210  -0.074  -0.030  0.110  0.1111 
   [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.197]  [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
Small -0.169  -0.107  -0.034  -0.022  0.072  0.0722 
   [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.010]**  [0.187]  [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
Sole Proprietorship  -0.115  -0.131  -0.028  -0.057  0.123  0.1199 
   [0.000]***  [0.005]***  [0.037]**  [0.012]**  [0.002]***  [0.001]*** 
Owner Manager  -0.091  -0.098  -0.004  0.018  0.038  0.0382 
 [0.008]***  [0.004]***  [0.839]  [0.543]  [0.123]  [0.113] 
Female Principal 
Owner  -0.045  -0.035  -0.002  -0.021  0.026  0.0249 
 [0.225]  [0.355]  [0.848]  [0.384]  [0.456]  [0.459] 
Age*Female -0.027  0.005  0.005  -0.004  -0.002  -0.0014 
 [0.077]*  [0.783]  [0.584]  [0.779]  [0.907]  [0.926] 
Partnership -0.027  -0.060  -0.006  -0.013  0.040  0.1622 
   [0.308]  [0.081]*  [0.410]  [0.539]  [0.096]*  [0.065]* 
Other Legal Type         -0.0458 
          [0.075]* 
Exporter 0.037  0.052  0.009  -0.019  -0.013  -0.0135 
   [0.011]**  [0.000]***  [0.257]  [0.287]  [0.276]  [0.227] 
Audit 0.098  0.034  0.010  -0.033  -0.036  -0.0357 
   [0.000]***  [0.083]*  [0.336]  [0.083]*  [0.025]**  [0.027]** 
Foreign Owned  -0.159  -0.188  -0.033  0.007  0.087  0.0884 
   [0.000]***  [0.047]**  [0.527]  [0.927]  [0.324]  [0.314] 
State Owned  0.1438  0.0117  0.0649  0.1591  -0.1384  -0.1377 
   [0.000]***  [0.874]  [0.122]  [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
Observations 12,399    14,129   13,477   13,772   14,129   14,129  
Pseudo R
2 0.30  0.16  0.19  0.09  0.14  0.14   2
Appendix 1:  List of Countries and Number of Observations 
 
 
Albania 537    Guyana 163    Poland  1,829 
Algeria  557   Honduras  450   Portugal  505 
Angola 540    Hungary  1,007    Romania  980 
Argentina  1,063   India  2,722   Russia  1,659 
Armenia 647    Indonesia  713    Rwanda  340 
Azerbaijan  657   Ireland  501   Saudi Arabia  681 
Bangladesh 1,001    Kazakhstan  982    Senegal  262 
Belarus  707   Kenya  284   Serbia  550 
Benin  197    Korea, Rep.  598    Slovak Republic  528 
Bhutan  98   Kosovo  329   Slovenia  536 
Bolivia 1,284    Kyrgyz  Republic  609    South  Africa  603 
Bosnia   509   Lao PDR  246   Spain  606 
Botswana 444    Latvia  547    Sri  Lanka  452 
Brazil  1,642   Lebanon  354   Swaziland  429 
Bulgaria 1,228    Lesotho  75    Syria  560 
Burkina Faso  51   Lithuania  756   Tajikistan  483 
Burundi 407    Macedonia 506    Tanzania 760 
Cambodia  503   Madagascar  293   Thailand  1,385 
Cameroon 119    Malawi  160    Turkey 2,544 
Cape Verde  47   Malaysia  902   Uganda  3,099 
Chile 948    Mali  155    Ukraine  5,004 
China  3,948   Mauritania  361   Uzbekistan  660 
Colombia 1,000    Mauritius  212    Vietnam 1,650 
Costa Rica  343   Mexico  1,480   Zambia  207 
Croatia 550    Moldova  766       
Czech Republic  760   Mongolia  195      
Dominican Republic  250    Montenegro  100       
Ecuador  453   Morocco  1,709      
Egypt 1,973    Mozambique  194       
El Salvador  465   Namibia  429      
Eritrea 79    Nepal 223       
Estonia  521   Nicaragua  452      
Ethiopia 427    Niger  125       
Gambia  301   Nigeria  232      
Georgia 374    Oman  337       
Germany  1,196   Pakistan  965      
Greece 546    Panama  604       
Guatemala  455   Paraguay  613      
Guinea 327    Peru  1,208       
Guinea-Bissau  296   Philippines  716        3
Appendix 2:  Variable Definitions and Mean Statistics 
 
Variable Name  Definition  Mean 
 
Measures of Access to Finance 
Bank Finance  Dummy (0/1) = 1 if the firm uses local or foreign bank finance for 
working capital or new investment, and =0 otherwise.  32% 
Operations Finance  Dummy (0/1) = 1 if the firm uses leasing, trade credit, or credit cards for 
working capital or new investment and =0 otherwise.  31% 
Informal Finance  Dummy (0/1) = 1 if the firm uses informal finance or family and friends 
for working capital or new investment and =0 otherwise.  14% 
Equity Finance  Dummy (0/1) = 1 if the firm uses new equity, grants, or ‘other’ financing 
for working capital or new investment and =0 otherwise.  19% 
Retained Earnings  Dummy (0/1) = 1 if the firm uses retained earnings for 100% of working 
capital and new investment financing and =0 otherwise.  20% 
Self-Fund Raising 
Dummy (0/1) =1  if the firm does not use local or foreign bank financing, 
but uses some other source of external financing (other than retained 
earnings) for working capital or new investment and =0 otherwise.  32% 
 
General Firm Characteristics 
Firm Age  Continuous variable equal to firm age  16.08 
Micro  Dummy (0/1) = 1 if the firm has less than 10 employees and =0 
otherwise.  26% 
Small  Dummy (0/1) = 1 if the firm has 10-49 employees and =0 otherwise.  39% 
Med/Large  Dummy (0/1) = 1 if the firm has 50 or more employees and =0 otherwise.  
(Excluded category).  35% 
Exporter  Dummy (0/1) = 1 if the firm exports more than 10% of its goods and =0 
otherwise.  23% 
Corp  Dummy (0/1) =1 if the frm is registered as a corporation and =0 
otherwise (partnerships and sole-proprietors are the excluded categories).  49% 
Audit  Dummy (0/1) =1 if the firm has audited financial statements and =0 
otherwise.  53% 
Foreign Own  Dummy (0/1) = 1 if the firm has foreign ownership and =0 otherwise.  5% 
State Own  Dummy (0/1) = 1 if the firm has state ownership and =0 otherwise.  4% 
 
Country Characteristics 
Rule of Law 
Measurement of “the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007, p. 4) (WB-WDI).  -0.30 
Credit Information Index 
Measurement of “the efficiency of rules affecting the scope, 
access, and quality of credit information”  (World Bank Doing Business 
database; http://www.doingbusiness.org/).   2.74 
Low Income Group 
 
Dummy (0/1) = 1 for countries with GNI per capita less than $766, and 
zero otherwise (WB-WDI).  37% 
Lower-Middle Income 
Group 
Dummy (0/1) = 1 for countries with GNI per capita between $766 and 
$3,035, and zero otherwise (WB-WDI).  36% 
Upper-Middle Income 
Group 
Dummy (0/1) = 1  for countries with GNI per capita between $3,036 and 
$9,385, and zero otherwise (WB-WDI).  19% 
High Income Group 
 
Dummy (0/1) = 1 for countries with GNI per capita in excess of $9,385, 
and zero otherwise (WB-WDI).  8% 
 
 